Why the Lebanese support the same sectarian leaders

Lebanese parliamentary elections are expected to take place in May 2017. The last elections were held eight years ago, in 2009. Although the parliament term in Lebanon is  four years, elections have been postponed twice since 2013 under the pretext of deadlock over electoral law, fear of instability and security unrest.
In November 2014, in an unconstitutional move, the Lebanese parliament renewed its mandate for a second time, granting itself an additional 31 months, ending in June 2017.
The country had already entered a political deadlock in May 2014, when the presidential seat became unoccupied after the end of former President Michel Suleiman's term. This situation continued for two years and half until the election of President Michel Aoun in October 2016.
This recent election of a president of the republic gave hope that institutional life was gradually coming back to Lebanese politics. However, despite the high hopes, most indicators today suggest that the parliamentary elections will be postponed again, given that the main leaders of the country have not yet been able to agree on an electoral law that satisfies everyone's wishes.
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However, regardless of the date the elections will take place or the law that will be adopted; the majority of Lebanese voters will probably chose the same traditional sectarian leaders and their proposed candidates once again.
The Lebanese system is based on the idea that sectarian leaders represent communities, they defend their interests and they regulate their conflicts.
This will happen at a time when corruption has reached unprecedented levels, leaders have proved - yet again - their unwillingness to solve any of the most basic and pressing problems such as electricity supply, housing, water or unemployment.
The re-election of the same leaders will happen while the majority of the Lebanese are unable to find a job in the country, have no access to good public education or hospitalisation and are struggling to make ends meet.
This is a time when neoliberal policies have become clearly entrenched; privatisation is discussed as the only solution for the electricity crisis, bank loans are being promoted as the answer to the housing crisis and wealth is more and more concentrated in the hands of a few.
In fact, the upcoming elections will be the first parliamentary elections after the rubbish crisis of 2015 when the #You_Stink movement managed to mobilise tens of thousands of angry Lebanese on to the streets, who accused the political elites of drowning the country in rubbish and corruption.
Despite all these conditions, the majority of the people will vote again for these same politicians.
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At first sight, this seems to be a puzzle. Why would voters once again choose representatives who have performed so badly? For many liberal commentators, the problem is understood at the individual level. They suggest that Lebanon's predicament lies in its "bad" leaders and, therefore, a solution to the country's problems would be to bring new 'blood' to the positions of power.
They criticise the "short-sighted" voters who "blindly follow their sectarian leaders and consider that "new" and "independent" alternatives should be available for the "enlightened citizens" who do not identify with this corrupt sectarian system and who want change.
Therefore, it is expected that a number of "independent" candidates will be standing in the upcoming elections, presenting themselves as "qualified", "honest" and "non-sectarian" alternatives. However, regardless of the qualifications and qualities of these candidates, the majority of the voters will still prefer the traditional leaders.
This is not because voters are naive, blind followers or are unaware of the corruption of their leaders. This is rather because voters are very aware of the structure of the Lebanese system. They see that voting for a few independent candidates is unlikely to solve any problem within the current structure of the Lebanese system. Let us revisit this system to clarify what I mean.
The end of the civil war was declared in 1989 with the signing of the Taif Agreement. This came to reinforce Lebanon's consociational formula of the post-independence National Pact and to adjust the sectarian balance of power.
The Taif Agreement was based on a reading of the civil war as a sectarian confrontation. It presumed that the Lebanese society is "deeply divided" along sectarian lines, and thus needed solutions that addressed these divisions to prevent the resumption of conflict. This led to a re-adoption of consociational prescriptions that allocate seats according to sects.
The essence of consociationalism, as explained by its famous theorist Arend Lijphart, is that negotiation and decision-making should only happen at the level of leaders who are the representatives of their sectarian communities. Lijphart argues that in "deeply-divided" societies, such as Lebanon, contact between groups in society is a bad idea and conflict can only be contained at the elite level.
Therefore the Lebanese system is based on the idea that sectarian leaders represent communities, they defend their interests and they regulate their conflicts.

Source: AL Jazeera