After the fire stops in Gaza

What is Hamas going to do after the fire stops in Gaza? How it will decide on its political positioning and how it will assess its relations and alliances? Would it get back to ally with the so-called "Resistance Axe" of Syria, Iran and Hezbollah, or it would take another step closer to the Qatar-Saudi Arabia-Turkey axe? And what about Hamas' position of the Palestinian reconciliations? Does it see the reconciliation as a temporary tactic to help it getting out of the current crisis, or it sees it as a real need that should be achieved through practical steps? All these questions are occupying the minds of the political observers concerned of the region, especially since the beginning of the ongoing Israeli aggression on the besieged enclave of Gaza. Before answering any of these questions, we must acknowledge that Hamas - along with all factions of the armed Palestinian resistance - would never have received such a large amount of weaponry and experience without the significant aid of their alliances with Tehran, Damascus and Hezbollah. Hamas, however, was always opened to cooperate with countries and groups out of this alliance. These countries and groups have also provided Hamas with political, financial and moral support, which was essential for Hamas to be as powerful as it is at the moment. The so-called "Moderate Arab Axe" - to which Hamas has been associated during the last year in particular - wants Hamas to lose its military power. Countries of this axe are aiming to turn Hamas into a political movement that can partner with Israel in a peace process based on negotiations, although peace negotiations are currently in last throes and the maximum of what the Palestinians can get from these negotiations falls short of their minimum aspirations and legitimate rights. If Hamas wants to commit to its original choice of resisting the occupation, it wouldn't find support from the "moderate Arabs" including the "new Egypt" which is currently led by Hamas' friends, the Muslim Brotherhood. So the Islamist movement will be forced to restore ties with at least two [Iran and Hezbollah] of its three old friends, after it burnt all bridges with Damascus. The moderate countries have been fed up with Hamas' uncertain position; Saudi Arabia sent a clear message to Hamas in that regard - choose us or Iran. Qatar adopted a more opened policy, as it decided to get closer to Hamas without any preconditions, but it is clear that the Qatari policy is aimed at attracting Hamas to distance gradually from Iran. A part of this policy is to fund the establishment of a new infrastructure in Gaza to cement ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, as the latter wouldn't be expected to gamble the destruction of this infrastructure by firing missiles at Israel. Turkey has a different agenda, it wants Hamas to be a window for the Turkish to Palestine, and so Turkey would have a greater influence on issues like the situation in Gaza, the Palestinian cause and the national reconciliation. Turkey has no reservations on Hamas' relation with Iran, but it would never support Hamas' military activities by any means, especially after Turkey's deep involvement in arming and training the Syrian rebels. Hamas has a very big decision to take; there is an essential need for the military support of Iran and Hezbollah, which is the only guarantee of keeping Hamas' military potential. On the other hand, Hamas can't convince the so-called moderate countries to support it as long as it keeps its relations with the Resistance Axe, as the hostility between the two camps is breaking new grounds. Syria is expected to be the main obstacle that could hinder Hamas' attempts to keep balanced relations with the two rival axes. Hamas has little options regarding this issue. It can't back off its affiliation to the Muslim Brotherhood who is fighting against the Syrian regime, and it can't back off its Sunni background as well. On the other hand, it can't restore its relations with Iran and Hezbollah while it is still supporting the Syrian opposition - particularly the Brotherhood - against Bashar al-Assad's regime. The Brotherhood-led Egypt may offer a haven to Hamas from the pressure exerted on it by the two axes. Hamas, however, knows well that Egypt can't offer too much due to the numerous internal problems facing the new Islamist government. Egypt wants Hamas to agree on a truce with Israel under "reasonable terms", and to bring more balance to its regional relations, in addition to being more open in the internal negotiations aimed at achieving a national reconciliation with Fatah as quickly as possible. I reckon these three points will be the main features of Hamas' policy after the end of the Israeli aggression on Gaza.     --- The views expressed by the author do not necessarily represent or reflect the editorial policy of Arabstoday.