Calculations of losing and losers

Whatever the final outcome of the Syrian crisis, some Palestinian and Lebanese sides will be among the top losers of the departure of the Syrian regime or even its continuation as a weak, disintegrated and beleaguered remnant. At the forefront comes the Lebanese Hezbollah and some of its allies in the the March 8 political bloc. Also set to loose out in Palestine is Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. It is needless to say that the loss will vary in terms of size and effect from one side to the other. Of all these sides, the destiny of Hezbollah, the future of its role and position, is of utmost interest to observers not owing to the unique national and regional weight of the movement but because it is a member of the “losers party” being the most active and effective side of the “resistance front” against Israel who deservedly recorded one of the most important and unique examples of perseverance and confrontation against Israeli occupation and aggression. Hezbollah will not end with the end of the Syrian regime or its downfall; this is a truth that must be recorded first. In this proposition, we rely on three essential factors sufficient to guarantee the effective presence of the movement even if its role or influence diminishes. The first factor is internal and related to the party’s amassing of the support of most Lebanese Shiites. This mobilises 30 percent of the Lebanese people under its flag, which is a factor of stability in role and representation that should not be ignored or denied especially if we add to them 10 of the Lebanese Sunnis and 33-50 percent of the Christians (the latter is a moving bloc that cannot be strategically guaranteed). The second factor is that Hezbollah, in the Iranian viewpoint, is more than just a strategic ally. It is an integral part of the Iranian “belief system” as obvious in Saeed Jalili’s latest visit to Lebanon. Iran’s commitment to support the party and preserve its sustainability is unshakable and nonnegotiable. Although it is true that Iran will find difficulty in linking the support “veins” from Tehran to the southern region and keeping them flowing, while this would affect the strength and effectiveness of Iranian support to the party, it is also true that Iran and the party will not miss an opportunity to find another passage for their support and its pipelines. The third factor lies in the “Middle-East moving sands” that do not stop tampering with the map of stances and alliances governing the movement of local, regional and international key players in the region. What seems like a blocked area and impossible partnership today, will turn tomorrow into open horizons and firm alliances. Here, the stakes are always continuously changing in positions and stance. For all these reasons, Hezbollah will remain an important digit in Lebanese and regional equations even if its role retreats or is redefined. I see a common interest in this fact for all the sides that will continue to see Israel as a main threat to Arab security, stability and rights. As for those who substituted one enemy for another, and to whom Iran became “the first and last enemy”, the party with all it represents will remain on their targeted list. What applies to Hezbollah, applies as much to the rest of its balancing allies in Lebanon. As for its minor allies who derive their weight, even their reason for existence, from their direct link to the Syrian regime and its security bodies, they will fall one by one. Some of them, as in the case of former minister Michel Samaha, started to pay the price before the existing regime falls in Damascus. As for the Amal Movement, the “Free Patriotic” Aun Movement, Arslan group (Lebanese Democtratic Party) and Suleiman Frangieh group (Marada Movement), they are streams and factions rooted in national reasons that make their cancellation very difficult On the Palestinian level, the Damascus factions in their final coalition form and when Hamas, the popular front and the democratic front, depart either with them or against them will be in a very tough situation and will be subject to practical extinction even if they formally preserve some representation within Palestinian circles for considerations basically related to the Hamas such as the Fatah power balance as is the case with the Arab Liberation Front and others today. These sides’ relations with Iran will not overshadow their absence on the ground in Palestine or in the diasporas with the exception of Islamic Jihad Movement which will preserve its presence and continuation due to having a true representation on the ground in the West Bank and the Strip whether small or major and because unlike Hamas, they succeeded in keeping their relations with Tehran. Of all these sides, the one most required to be neutralised is Hezbollah. In this regard, we expect an initiative from Hamas and the sides that preserved their stability like the Muslim Brotherhood organisations in the Arab world and Al-Jama`a Al-Islamiyyah in Lebanon to take a bridging initiative aiming at changing the routes of sectarian division digging deep in the Arab and Muslim world. This initiative would provide a Sunni safety net to the intrinsically Shiite party on the basis of reformulating the maps of alliances in the region. Such aspired initiative would not place “democracy” in a contradiction with or against another “democracy”. It would remind all Arabs that it is Israel who is occupying their lands, gulping their rights, judaizing their Jerusalem and confiscating their Al-Aqsa Mosque. Our talk about the axes of this initiative and its details are to be continued. --- The views expressed by the author do not necessarily represent or reflect the editorial policy of Arabstoday.