Khairallah Khairallah
The experience of the late Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid reflects to what extent the Algerian ruling regime
was and is still strongly resistant to any king of change. Bendjedid, who died nine days ago, was
pronounced president of Algeria in February 2012, after, what we can describe as a secret military coup. He was
ousted by another secret military coup in January 1992; the date when the military decided to get rid of him
because of his insistence to go in the path of change until the end.
The former president, who was an army commander himself, failed to realise that he was supposed to be only a
top cover for the military rule in the country, and this is why he was toppled. once he dared to act independently of
the military institution which put him on the president's seat in 1979. This is a brief of a story of an honest man who
tried to make a change in Algeria after he realised how deep the crisis that afflicted Algeria was since its
independence in 1962.
When late President Houari Boumediene died late in 1978, Colonel Chadli Bendjedid was the commander of the
second military region in west Algeria. He was one of the oldest military commanders age-wise, so he was chosen
by his fellows to succeed Boumediene because they thought he would not put the military commanders' privileges
at risk. The military did not believe this was the case with the two other civilian candidates; foreign minister Abdelaziz
Bouteflika, who represented the pro-western upper class, and Mohammad Saleh Yahiaoui, who represented the
conservative bureaucrats of the ruling National Liberation Front (PFLN).
The military who had little confidence in both of the two previously mentioned politicians, brought Colonel
Bendjedid from the shadows to sit on the president's chair to replace them. Bouteflika, who was the strongest
candidate, was forced to wait until 1999 to reach the position he always believed he deserved, ironically, his
appointment as a president was also mainly thanks to the military.
Chadli Bendjedid didn't have any special attributes which could qualify him to be the successor of Boumediene,
who led Algeria to play a significant role in both the regional and international arenas thanks to the stability enjoyed
by his regime. This was due to the strong security-partisan system imposed by the PFLN leaders in the country,
and the outstanding financial power provided by the revenues of gas and oil exports. During the early stages of his
tenure, Bendjedid found no serious problems in assuming the duties of his new position, because his security and
partisan apparatuses were in full control over the country. But once the oil prices started to slump, Bendjedid
suddenly realised how heavy the legacy of Boumediene's era was.
The once dominant security agencies found themselves powerless against the people's uprising that broke out in
the autumn of 1988, on the back of an economic crisis that left huge numbers of young Algerians jobless, and
caused a housing problem in almost all the cities and regions of the country. These problems added to a notable
rise in religious extremism due to a vulnerable education system.
In October 1988, Bendjedid finally realised what was really happening in his country. He saw the Algerian people
rushing into the streets and destroying the headquarters of the so-called "liberation movements", to which Algeria
used to offer shelter and funds at the expense of the poor citizens. The Algerians have targeted particularly the
offices of the separatist Polisario Front, which the Algerian regime was depending on in blackmailing Morocco.
Although the "1988 uprising" was a turning point in changing Bendjedid's beliefs, the late Algerian president had
actually realised some of the country's problems a bit earlier, particularly the failure of the programme of
redistributing cultivated lands and the huge investments in building heavy industries without an effective marketing
strategy. He also realised that it was better for Algeria to focus on its internal problems instead of being too
involved in regional conflicts, which Algeria had nothing to do with. He had already made shy attempts to pull his
country out of the internal conflict in Morocco over the Sahara region.
However, Bendjedid failed in achieving a breakthrough in settling his country's dispute with Morocco over the
Sahara, despite the serious efforts exerted by the late Saudi King Fahd bin Abdulaziz to reduce the gap between
both countries' positions.
What happened in 1988 was a chance for Chadli Bendjedid to apply true reforms to pave the way for a democratic
regime, which Bendjedid himself had dreamt of. He had really exerted great efforts in that regard including issuing
a new law that allowed partisan pluralism in the country, but his efforts were eventually in vain as it reached the
barriers set by the military. The military forced Bendjedid to step down his position, as they were afraid he would
acknowledge the results of the municipal elections of 1991, which showed a landslide victory for the Islamists. This
victory reflected the regime's political bankruptcy and the lack of political awareness by the vast majority of the
people as well.
Since he was toppled early in 1992. Bendjedid resumed his life as a common citizen, rather than a retired
president. He kept himself away from politics, which he was never substantially interested in.
Until the moment, nothing has changed in Algeria's political scene since Bendjedid's ousting. The Arab Maghareb Union,
which Bendjedid himself helped establish in 1989, was supposed to bring the Maghreb countries closer and normalise
the relations among them, but this target was foiled due to Algeria's insistence on meddling in the Sahara issue, in
addition to the mad conducts of the slain Libyan dictator Muammer Gaddafi.
The Algerian army and security apparatus have admittedly played an important role in defeating the terrorist groups
operating inside the country. But they were responsible for the deadlock which prevented Algeria from building a
democratic regime that would firstly work to achieve Algerian people's aspirations, and would dare to address the
roots of Algeria's crises, like the failure of the agricultural and industrial plans which cost the country billions of US
Dollars, in addition to the failure of the programmes of "Arabising" education; the programmes that failed to teach
Arabic to the Algerians but succeeded in making them forget the French language.
Algeria's ruling regime is yet to reach a reconciliation with the Algerian people and Algeria's neighbours, as it is
escaping from addressing the true roots of the country's problems, depending on the financial revenues of gas and oil
exports, nothing more.
How long will the Algerian ruling regime escape facing the country's problems? That is the questions which is yet to be
answered. All what we can say on Chadli Bendjedid after his death at the age of 83, is that he was a man who wanted
to lead a change in his country, but was hindered and eventually eliminated by a military institution, which considered
its own privileges more important than anything else, even the benefits of Algeria and the Algerians.
The views expressed by the author do not necessarily represent or reflect the editorial policy of Arabstoday.