Study cites ‘sins’ of Egypt revolution

A new study by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Prof. Thomas J. Brown laments the “lapse” of the Egyptian revolution’s promise “into hard political realities.” With less than two thirds of the total turnout approving the draft constitution in the recent referendum, Brown writes, “the fruits of the revolution seem bitter indeed.” In direct contract with the pure start of Egypt’s transition, the George Washington University professor says, Egypt’s political scene has spiralled into “fratricidal political struggles, outraged and outrageous accusations, occasional violence, and fear.” Brown opens his study entitled “Can Egypt’s Democratic Uprising Be Redeemed?” by laying out the tragic arc of Egypt’s revolution: “In a forgotten burst of national unity, Egyptians rejoiced on February 11, 2011, amazed at what they had done: forced a longtime autocrat from office with massive protests throughout the country. In the outwardly immaculate political moment of that uprising, it was easy to conceive of a peaceful transition to an open, democratic, just, and more prosperous future. Less than two years later, that seeming democratic genesis has lapsed into hard political realities. A new constitution has been approved. But preliminary figures report less than two-thirds approval (a very low rate in a country where voters have become accustomed to being asked to say yes) and a turnout of under one-third. Today, the fruits of the revolution seem bitter indeed—fratricidal political struggles, outraged and outrageous accusations, occasional violence, and fear.” Political science professor Mohammed Salman told Arabstoday that the Brown’s analysis appeared to be realistic to a great extent. Most Egyptians feel disillusioned, Salman said, and some of them wish to recover Mubarak’s rule, especially among the poor and the so-called ‘party of the sofa:’ a local term used to refer to those who do not involve themselves in matters political but make do with watching it all unfold on television. Salman also told Arabstoday that Egyptians made the mistake of conducting parliamentary elections before a constitution was put in place and before the Islamist current took over parliament and the constituent assembly. At the time, many politicians called for the constitution to be drafted first, led by Dr Mohammed el-Baradei, the current chairman of the Constitution Party. Brown’s study goes on to note: “Egypt’s revolution was made by a collection of intrepid activists with diffuse agendas, crowds of ordinary citizens entering politics for the first time, Muslim Brotherhood cadres that were disciplined but cautious, and state bodies that either stayed aloof or were unable to defend the old regime. But the very characteristics that served the cause of political change in early 2011 later entrenched both suspicions and suspicious behavior.” “At this point,” the report says, “the sins of the past year and a half seem very clear, especially in light of the bitterness engendered on all sides by the constitutional referendum. The tale would seem to be one of overreaching and majoritarian Islamists, fractious and incompetent non-Islamist opposition actors, and scheming elements of a deep state.” The study, published on the website of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Center, marks the “flawed process” of transition itself as the “original sin” that took Egypt from heady euphoria to frustration. Brown writes: “Egyptians are operating in a framework that would have been difficult for angels to manage fairly. The Egyptian transition was not badly designed; it was not designed at all. The original sin of the Egyptian transition lies in a series of short-sighted decisions taken by generally well-meaning but myopic actors thrust into limited authority in February and March 2011. At the time, there were extended debates about the sequence of presidential elections, parliamentary elections, and constitution writing. But much of that debate missed the point and blinded both analysts and activists to the real mistakes that were being made.” The second sin, according to Brown, lay in “implementation:” “As Egypt’s transition stumbled forward,” Brown tells us, “there was nothing to deliver various political forces into anything other than the temptations generated by mutual envy, wrath at adversaries, and greed for political power. The gaps opened in March [2011, by the referendum on constitutional amendments] lay not only in the areas of permanent political reconstruction but also in governance during the transition period.” Brown lists the third sin as Morsi’s controversial constitutional declaration of November 22, which sparked violent protests. Brown: “Morsi’s moves amounted to a breathtaking assertion of authority and a bold assault on many unwritten (and a few written) rules of Egyptian politics; he set himself up not merely as chief executive but also as sole legislator and beyond judicial oversight. However temporary some of these moves were, Egypt will not easily recover.” Political analyst Amr Heshan Rabia agreed about Brown’s three sins, citing the political conflicts between the intelligentsia and the Muslim Brotherhood as the principal reason behind Egypt’s current condition. The political ambitions of both camps, Rabia said, has caused loss of life and destroyed economic indicators which have a direct effect on the lives of Egyptians. Political matters must be resolved through consolidating efforts and national and societal dialogue resulting in direct and honest conclusions that avert the need for political floundering, wrong-footing, hurling accusations and mistrusting intentions. The Islamist and liberal camps exchange blame in bad faith, the analyst said, and the only loser in this blame game is the Egyptian individual who wants nothing but stability and a human standard of living. Prof Brown’s study went on to describe the transition process as “deeply problematic,” explaining that it “created an environment that encouraged actors to adopt strategies and tactics that made sense for them over the short term but have proved very harmful for Egypt’s long-term political reconstruction.” On the future, the study concludes: “If there is any cause for hope now, it is that the constitutional referendum might force actors to recalculate. The Brotherhood might finally realize that it can get much of what it wants through less heavy-handed methods, and the opposition might find that the electoral process offers it the greatest possibilities of success. Only if actors perceive their options differently can Egypt break free from its current crisis.”